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Youth, Media and Culture in the Arab World
Abstract
'Traditionally, Arab society dealt with youth in a superficial and slightly condescending manner’, an Arab
columnist wrote recently, ‘offering the occasional sports club and scout troop, a usually underfunded and
dysfunctional govemment ministry or organization for youth issues, and a correspondingly noncredible
occasional speech by a highranking official stressing that youths are the promise of the future'(Khouri,
2005). In light of this somber diagnosis with which many analysts of the Arab world would concur, it
appears paradoxical that, today, Arab youth is at the center of some of the most important and
controversial debates, from the impact of Western modernity on gender roles and social relations to
consumerism and radical political violence. The scope of these debates transcends the borders of the 22
states making up the Arab world in a post September 11, 2001, environment where Arab youth has
become a site that is contested both internally and externally. Young Arab women and men are
simultaneously subjected to competing and oftentimes conflicting messages from their parents,
educational and religious institutions, the vibrant Arab satellite television industry, 'public diplomacy' from
the USA, Iran and others, and the interlocking economic, technological and cultural forces of
globalization.
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Youth. Media and Culture
in the Arab World
Marwan M. Kraidy and Joe F. Khalil

INTRODUCTION
‘ Traditionally, Arab society dealt with yOllth
in a superficial and slightly condescending
manner’, an Arab columnist wrote recently,
‘ offering the occasional sports c1 11b and scout
troop , a usually underfundεd and dysfunc
tional govemment rninistry or organization
for youth issues , and a correspondingly
noncredible occasional speech by a highranking official stressing that youths are the
promise of the future ’ (Khouri , 2005). In
ligbt of lhis somber diagnosis with which
many analysts of the Arab world wOllld
concur, lt appεars paradoxical that, today,
Arab youth is at the center of some of the most
importallt and controversial debates , from
the impact of Westem modernity on gendεr
roles and soci a1 relations to consumerism
and radical political violence. The scope of
these debates transcends the borders of the
22 states making up the Arab world in a post
September 11 , 2001 , environment where Arab
youth has becornε a site that is contested
both internally and extemally. Young Arab
•

women and men are simultaneously subjected
to competing and oftentimes conflicting
messages from their parents , educational and
religious instihltions , the vibrant Arab satellite
television industry, ‘ Pllblic diplornacy’ from
the USA, Iran and others, and the inter1 0cking
economic , technological and cultural forces of
globalization 1
The central role the rnedia play in the life
of young people is widely acknowledgεd by
scholars and policy-makers. Media and information technologies are instrumεntal in both
youth cultural consumption and production;
as such, they shape the dynamics of youth
culh1fe. In acknowledgement of this context ,
the exhaustive United Nations Youth Report
2005 , states that ‘ it is impossible to under
takean 얘εctive examination ofyouth cultures
without e.λploring young peop/e ’s relationship
with the media ’ (Departrnent of Economic
and Social Affairs , 2005: 82 , ernphasis
added). Like youth in other parts of the
world , young Arabs are avid users of mobile
telephones and text-messaging , the internet , satellîte tεlevision anJ popular music
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Aggressive advertising campaigns and syner
gies betwecn telecommunications and media
companies promote these media consumption
activitie ‘ 111e explosion of commercial tele
vision genres has contrìbuted to the crεatlOn
of a ‘ hypermedia space' (Kraidy, 2006a) by
activating interactìve multimedia uses for
television , the internet and mobile telephony
As the development of this commercial
hypermedia space has intensified debates
about the socialization of youth and children , these communication possibilities have
ernpowered youth expression in new ways
The mu1tifaceted and comp1εx relationship
between Arab youth andmεdia may, therefore ,
be difficult to comprehend through traditiona1
research approaches that focus on one type of
media (te1evision , internet , etc.) or one issue
(violence , sεxuality， etc.)
This chapter attempts to provide a compre
hensìve view of Arab youth and medìa that
is multìdisciplinary, historically informed ,
and concεptu a11y based. lt follows a top
down approach based on both secondm"y
sourcεs and on fie1dwork at Ar ab media
organizations. To meet this objective , we
have organized the chapter into three main
sections: The first focuses on socio cu1tura1
de-traditionalization , treating issues of changing cultural values and social nonns. The
chapte ’ s second section naITows down on the
consumerist impεratives of the cornmercial
Arab media environment , and discussεs topics
such as advertising , multimedia synergies
and product placements. The third section
dìscusses the politic a1 implications of media
dirεcted at Arab youth , ranging from loc a1
FM radio stations to US propaganda in the
context of the so-called ‘ war on terronsm ’
Our analysis will focus on established and
emerging trends in thε relationship between
Arab youth and the media , dwelling on key
case studies while refemng to a divεrsc range
of examples (instihltions , genr야， medium)
By ana1ytically linking 01d and new media
in the lives of chi1dren and young peop1e ,
we hope this chapter provides a comparative
perspective on an area of research that
suffers , according to at least onε authontative
account, from ‘ fragmentation, small sarnple
•

•
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groups , non-comparability and a 재!estεrn
cu1tura1 focus' (Depm"t mεnt of Economic and
Socia1 Affairs , 2005: 84). Because of this
chapter's broadscope which covers numerous
countries, several media, and a vmiety of
socîal and political issues , some degree of
generalization is inevitable. We hope that
readers wil1 make use of our references to
accεss scholarship about specific Ar ab media
lssues
Thε existence of tensions between global
mεdia-oriented youth culture and local tm
ditions is beyond dispute. However, Arabs
experience lhis c1 ash in pmticularly acute
fonn , for several reasons. First is the genera
tiona1 gap betwεen contemporary Arab youth
and their parents. According to the United
Nations Popu1ation Fund , around 34% of the
population of Arab countries is under the agε
of 15 , and the median age for the Arab region
is 22. 2 There is vmiation between states , but
young peop1ε make up between one-third
and one-ha1f of nationa1 pop버ations. Whìle
intergenerational differences are a universal
phenomenon , in the Arab world thesε dif
ferences ride a wave of fundamental and
far-reaching changes that have occurred over
the last 30 years in the political , economic ,
cu1tura1 and educational structures of most
Arab countlies. These include the opening up
since the 1960s of higher education to most
Arabs , the transition from traditionaJ desert
cu1ture to hyper-modern, oil-fuel1ed, mediasaturated economies in the Gulf countdes ,
the rise of political Islamisrn , and the major
political and military upheavals experienced
by Arabs in the 1ast few decadεs. Especially
important in shaping social and political
deve10pments in the Arab wor1d is what
Eicke1man (1998) called the combination of
‘ mass education and mass communication ’
Chances are that a 40-year 01d Arab fathe
today grew up in a world where there was
only one state television channel , which did
not air advcrtisemεnts， was the fìrst in his
family to obtai n a uni versity dεgree， and has
had a decent1y paid job with a govemment
agency. His 1O-year-01d son, howζver， was
born amidst the Arab information revolution ,
can choose between more than 200 sate11i te

,
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tεlevision channels saturated with commercial
me ‘ sages , surf the internet and use his
mobile tclephone to vote for his favorite
reality tclevision contestant or to request his
fa、rorite music video. According to World
Bank figures , the number of television sets
per 1000 people in the Arab world is around
200 , double that of low~income countries
(for example in sub~Saharan Africa) , but
much smaller than the number in high-income
countries, which is abovε 600 (UNDP, 2004) ‘
IntClTIεt penetration in the Ar배 reglO n ranges
from 30% of thε population in the United
Arab Emiratcs to close to 0% in Sudan ,
with Lebanon at 10% and Saudi Arabia
below 3% (UNDP, 2004), Experiences of this
generational gap are different from onε Arab
country to another, but the emerging reglonal
youth culture , much of it revolving around
hypennedia space , creates a sεnse of shared
community among those who partake in it
The intergenerational gap is widened not only
by the newly available technologi않， but by the
behaviors and vocabularies that youth culture
devε:lops around rituals of consumption and
technology use , which tend to be exclusive of
adu It s
The global youth culture , to which some
young Arabs gravitate with various degrεes
ofbεlonging determined by language ability,
socio-economic c1 ass and gωgraphicalloca
tion , navigates contempormy hypermedia
space through rituals of consumption , like
wearing the same c10thing brands , listening
to the same pop artists , eating the same fastfood and watching the same movi앙 Th us , thε
global, media-driven, consumption-centεred
youth culture reproduces itsεIf through the
ritualized consumption it promotes. This
process does not necessarily lead to cu 1tural
homogenization. It mostly results in various
fonns of cultural hybridity embodied in
so c a1led ‘ world music ’ or in branded mix
and~match clothing styles which indicate that
global youth culture is a hodge~podge of
international cu 1tural influences. 3
In the Arab world, this hybridity exac~
erbates intergenerational conflict because it
hinders value transmission according to thε
postfigurative (hierarchical and strict) mod리
•

‘

by introducing hoTÏzontal value transmission
between young people wor1 dwide and within
the Arab region. 4 This accelerates socio
cultural change to the extent that it reduces
parents ’ infiuence on their children in favor of
increasing theÎr exposure to peer and foreign
cultural inftuences , and increases the appe따
of re1igiously couched , anti-popular culture
arguments espoused by many Arab Islamist
groups and political parti얹
At the same time, global culture is locally
appropriated by the IsJamists , creating a
diffεrent hybrid where local themes are
gratìed onto global forms: examples incJ ude
Sami Yusuf, a British-born Muslim with Azeri
origins , who has εmerged as a creator of
‘ Islarnic music videos ’, or, more generally,
the advent of Islamic television. In the past,
the notion of Islamic ‘ programs ’ on Arab state
television were lÌmited to short (flεw minutes)
segments that reminded Muslims of prayer
time five times a day. An εxception to this
trend was state television in Gu1f countries ,
which routinely featured 1i ve broadcasts of
sermons , religious talk shows and scripture
readings. The advent of satellite tεlevision
paved the way for fully dedicated religious
channels , rnostly based in Saudi Arabia with
studios in Egypt and Dubai. For example ,
in 1998 the Saudi~owned Arab Radio and
Television (ART) estab!i shed ‘ Iqraa ’ (Read)
as an Islamic channε1 appe a1ing to wornen
and youth worldwide. Until then , Saudi
Channel One was the main re1 igious channel ,
wilh 50% religious-oriεnted programming
lqraa ’ s appεal rests in its 100% religlous programming emulating entertainrnent television
with several male and female ‘ born-again ’
preachers , and live interaction with audiences
The trend set forth by ‘ Iqraa ’ was soon
fo Jl owed by Al Majd (the Glory) and Al Risala
(the Message). The first grew in 2002 out
of a Saudi-owned Islamic publishing house
to include seven television and radio sate1lite
channels AI~Majd channe l, a Kor ’ an channel ,
a science channel, a historical channel, a
news channel and two chi1 dren ’ s channels
The second, AI~Risala ， was established in
2006 as part of the Rotana network with a
youth focus. It has a slick screen appearance
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and features a mix of prayer, talk shows and
mUSIC
These channe1s helped create two typεs
of religious star: the tele-nu띠is and teledai ’ a (or preachers). Starring in his Al Jazeera
show titled Al Sharia wal Hayat (Islamic
law and l(fe) , the Egyptian mufti Yusuf
al-Qaradawi is ‘ ues religious opinions known
as fatwas and discusses general social and
political issues. Tradition aJly, the dai ’ a 18 a
born-again Muslim who dedicates his life to
rεligious preaching. Satel1 ite te1εVlS lOn gave
dai ’ as like the Egyptian Amr Khaled superstar
status. Khaled ’ s charisma, trendy clothing,
and ‘ modernist’ Islamic discourse focusing
on youth has led to ovεr-the-air skinnishes
between him and rnore establishεd re1i gious
leaders , like al-Qaradaw i. In addition to
fi 1ling a market niche , mainstream Islarnic
media are seen as an antidote to the radical
and sometirnεs violεnt media underground ,
largely re' tricted to the interne t. Also , by
adopting ‘ modern ’ media technologies and
styles to spread their message , Islamic
media indicate that as ‘ the cultura1 10gic
of globalization ’ (Kraidy, 2005), hybridity
can sometimes operate as counter-logic. In
other words , hybIidity can reftect intercul
tura1 relations with various distdbutions of
poweI
Unlike the fami1y-focused , living room
basεd ， fixed← time radio listεning or television
viewing of the past , the new hypennedia
space is basεdonpεrsonalized ， interactive and
mobile communication devices and practices
Therεfore ， it weakens the bonds of collective
socia11ife on Arab chi1dren and young peop1e ,
contributing to thè transformation of their
cultural identities by changing the sources
they use for ‘ identity work’ (Ziehe , 1992)
Although se1ecting foreign , regiona1 (Arab)
and local elements for identity construclion
existed before the advent ofhypermedia space
(e.g. see Havens (200 J) and Kraidy (1 999)) ,
the environment permits a proliferation of
cultural sources of identity. Also , the intε:rac
tivity of text-messaging and intemet chatting ,
for examp1e, challenges the traditiona1, top
down modeJ of socialization by making
young Arabs active cultural producers. These

‘
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developments reftect an intergenerational
leap , since the media world of previous
gεnerations of Ar abs consisted mostly of daily
newspapers and state television chalme1 s‘
These were cu1tural1y policed in ordεr to
promote national identity and unity, and
technically 1imited to the onε way, non
interactive , transrnÎssion of infonnation. The
combination of an ever-increasing number of
cultural sources of identity with the interactive
possibilities of hypennedia presents two
challenges
First , although the media provide some
of the most significant component for
bu i1ding youth identity, the constmction of
Arab youth identity is complicated by the
paucity of indigenous cultural production ,
including books, cinema and, to a lesser
extent , television. While the hypermedia
space involvεs numerous media and information technologies , television remains the
dominant medium , and television , even when
in the Arabic language , Îs permeated by
Western ideas and values. In other words ,
sources from which young , εspeci aJ1y rniddle
class, English-speaking, Arabs draw on whεn
defining their identity tend to be inftuenced by
Wεstern， mostly US , popu1ar culture and its
focus on individual identity and consumerÏsm
(Kh alil , 2005). T죄is is a reflεction of the
crisis of Arab cultural production at large ,
detailed in the Arab Hwnan Development
Report 2003 , which was written by Arab
inteI1 ectuals andrεsεarchεrs under the aegìs of
the United Nations Development Programme
and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Dεve10pment. Chapter 3 , ‘Knowledge pro
duction in arab countries’, gives a view of thc
CriSIS ‘ Arab countries , with 5% of the wo r1 d ’s
population , produce J. J % of the world ’ s
books , a figure that falls be10w 1% if we
on1y consider literary books. Wìth a potential
audience of 270 million Arab speakcrs in
22 countrie1、 on1y 1000 to 3000 copies of
a novel are usually pub1ished (UNDP, 2004
77-78). Theatrical and cinematic production ,
III spltε of the famed Egyptian cinema and the
emergence of high-quality Syrian te1εVlSIOn
drama , mirrors this situation. Batlered by cell
sorship , undermined by widespread illiteracy

‘
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and hlndered by the lack of funding , Arab
litermy and dramatÎc creative talent is-unable
to thrivc
Profiting from state-private cooperation,
tclevision drama has raised the profile and
the income of writers in countries likε
Egypt and Syria and to a 1ι‘ser extent
Lebanon and the Gulf countries. But this trend
has been thwarted , since tclcvision officials
prefer the low-risk , high-yield strategy of
f01mat adaptation. Hence , the wave of reality
te1 evision , game-shows , music videos and
other formats imported from North America
or Europe domÎnates Arab entertainment
television , most starkly transnational satellite
telεvision. Thεse shows present ‘ Western ’
formats that are adaptεd and reproduced
in Arabic by Arab directors , actors and
participants , and are often embedded in
synergistic strategies including advel1ising OI
sponsorship dεals ， in addition to audio music
and music video deals. As we explain later
in this chapteι this mixing of wor1 dviews
has frequently triggered controversy for
promoting commercialism and W，εstern← style
social relations bεtwεen fernales and mal잉，
and for sapping putative Arab or Islamic
identities
Differεntial access to thε new Arab hyperrnedia space is the second problem. The
advent of a comrnercial rnedia environrnent
tends to exclude thoseArabs who are not desir
able targεts of advertisers. It is wε11 known
that the focus of the ovenνhεlming majority
of Arab media products are the countries of
the Gulf Cooperation Council , which inc1 udes
Saudi Arabia , Oman , Qatar, Bahrain , the
Unitεd Arab EmiTates and Knwai t. Television
programmers and othel' ‘ content providcrs ’
focus mostly on Saudi Arabia , by far the
largest and wealthiest Arab marke t. Program
previews and promotions on most satellite
telεvision channels, for example, give the
time of a pal1icular program in ‘ Saudi Arabia
Time’ in addition to GMT 0'- the timε of the
location of the channel. With the growing
financialimportance of mobile phone toll cal1 s
or text messages in the context of voting in
reality television prograrns , requesting music
videos or sending love me ‘ sages on mUSlC

channels , the Arab media industry ’ s focus
on the oil-rich Gulf countries is increasing
and reshaping production and programming
decisions
The rising importance of thε rnarkets of
Saudi Arabia , Kuwait and the United Arab
Ernirates exacerbates the socio-economic gap
between poor and rich Arab countries as
the Arab public sphere becomes increasingly
dominated by the desires , interests and voicεs
of the wealthy. Poor young Ar abs with blεak
employment prospects and restricted social
conditions are reduced to watching advertisers
cater to a select g이 den Arab youth as thεy
ftaunt designer c1othes , hip mobile phones and
extravagant lifestyles. Whilε this is to some
extent true of commercial media wo r1 dwide ,
the large income differences and the speed
with which the Arab media shifted from
state← contro11εd monopolies to companies
motivated by a mixture of commercial and
political interests further complicate the
situation. Highly popular reality television
programs , which include participants frorn
many Arab countries , milTor the inter-Arab
cleavage with the Gulf countries on one
side and everyone else on the other. Both
a1li ances between contestants on these shows
and audiencε voting patterns fa l1 into this
pattern in which diffεrences in social class and
sub-regional identÎties overlap
The paucity of indigenous cultural pro
duction and differential access to the media ,
the two problεrns discussαJ above , indicate
that the cornmercial media envirornuent
contributes significantly, both vertical1y and
horizontal1y, to segregation of the Arab
population. Vertically, it isolate1 young people
from their parents. In addition to a commu
nicative umverse replete with logos , words ,
symbols and icons that arε Western inspired
and unpalatablε to their parents , privileged
young Arabs are increasingly spending Jeisure
time surfing the internet , chattìng on mobìle
phones , playing video games or watching
youth specific programs on television 낌lese
relativεly solitary activitiζs are transform
ing Arab social relations and older media
consumption habits that had been based on
cornmunal listening or viewing followed by

‘
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group or family conversations (this follows
a sin피 ar trend towards indlvidual usage
in the West; for example , see Livingstonε
and Bovill (1 999)). Horizontally, the new
commercial media enviromnent discriminates
between young people on the basis of social
economic status. The focus on the wealthy
Gulf countries and the upper middle class in
major cities 1ike Cairo , Damascus or Beirut
risks exacerbating class divisions both within
and between Arab countries. The media’ s
exc1usion of large segments of the Arab
population who are not relevant to advertisεrs
raises a set of important qu않 tions about
politìcal p따ticipation in Arab socìeties , to be
discussed later in tms chapter

ARAB YOUTH BETWEEN GLOBAl
CULTURE AND LOCAL AUTHENTICITY
In the new communication environment that
significantly ovεrlaps with a global, media
drìven youth culture , young Arabs have
found a new space of socialization that
is deeply permeated by ‘ foreign' cultural
and soci a1 values , a process that started
several centurìes earlier with missionaries
in the Levant but that is more rεcent In
the Gulf region. The Arab world is similar
in this r앉pect to other paπs of the world
where youth rnedia culture now compεtes
with traditional farn i1 y-based social structure
in the socialization of children and young
peop1e. This process , which is embedded in a
larger trend of ‘ dεtraditiona1ization’ 아leelas
et al‘, 1996) , is accelerating the creation
of hybrid cultural forms and identities (for
example in Lebanon; see Kraidy (1 999))
in processes where yOllth cobble together
social identities from a resεrvoir of resources
in which youth media cu 1ture loorns large
What makes the Arab countnes distinct is
that it is a region in which pllblic discourse
is consumed by concerns for identity and
authenticity, within a field defined at one
end by Islamic piety and re1i gious identification (and that includes Christians such
as Egyptian Copts and Lebanese Maronites)

‘

341

and at the other end by Arab nationalism
and political identification. The current geo
political upheavals rocking the Arab region ,
such as the invasion of Traq and the protracted
confiict between Israelis and Palestinians ,
have intensified concerns about identity at a
time when the USA has made it a policy to
change the political , economic and culture
stnlctures of Arab cOllntries. At the same time ,
the isslle of political reform is a pεnnanent
fixture in Arab public discourse and is perhaps
the only area where secular liberals agree with
Islamist activists
In this context , Arab media targεtmgyoung
people play a balancing act , on the one
hand respecting e tablished traditions , but at
the same time introducing new ideas both
for commercial reasons and also as a socia1
and political imperative. Commercially, Arab
mεdia εntrepreneurs are cognizant that the
consumerism and sexualized semiotics of
global youth culture offer tremendous profit
opportunities. They also know that young
Arabs are alienated by the often poorly
PH띠uced programs that state channels offer
them , preferηng an informal and interactive
style , a situation in which thεy are similar
to Western youth (e.g. Buckingham, 2000)
Socially and politically, there is a general
sense that the status quo is llntenable , and
some refonn-minded media owners iI벼]se
the ne\ν communication environment with
their ideas about refonning Arab societies
Nowhere ls this search for a balanced recipe
nn잉 ng tradition and modernity, entertain
ment with a social message , morε visible
than in the case of the Rotana rnedia
conglomerate
The history of Rotana mirrors that of its
owner, Saudi Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal, a
‘ forward-thinking ’ member of the Saudi royal
family and a Lebanese citizen by virtue of
his Lebanese mothe r. Bin Ta1 al is a successful
glob a1 investor whose media holdings have
inc1 udζdthε satellite channcl of LBC and
Murr Television , a now-defunct Lebanese
station , in addition to Rupert Murdoch ’ sNews
Corporation , CNBC and StarTY. In 1995 , Bin
Talal acqui.red 25% of Saudi-based Rotana
Audio Visual Company, which specializes
•
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in the production and dist !i bution of Arab
music. Bin Talal'8 interest in music production
increased over the years and 80 did his shares
in Rotana , from 48% in 2002 to 100% in
2003 5

Bin Talal' s plan to build amεdia empire that
integrated music production and distribution
led him in 2003 to acquire the music channel
of the Arab Radio and Television (ART)
bouquet. Rebranded Rotana , it expanded
mto a nεtwork of four music channels ,
one movie channel and a religious channel callεd al-Risala. Valued at over US$l
b i1l ion, Rotana has more than 2500 music
videos and 5000 recordεd li ve performances
Bin Talal is now capable of producing ,
distributing and marketing any singer in
house. Wh ile Ki ngdom Holding (Bin Talal' s
major company) and Rotana music are based
in Saudì Arabia , Rotana television is based
ìn Beirut. Rotana’ s four music channels
do not follow MTV ’ s tradition of using
video jockeys (VJs) in the programs; instead
the VJs are charged with tying different
programs or sequences together. For Ínstance ,
on the Rotana Khaleejiyyah , specializing in
Arabian Gulf music , the VJs recite poεtry
as interludεs between sets of music videos
Except for Rotana Clip , which caries audience
requests , the three channels have regular
prograrnming that is primarily youth oriented
By ‘ translating ’ the MTV VJ tradition for an
Arab audience and inserting poetry (a highJy
popu때 literary form in the Arab world)
between songs , Rotana εffectively localizes
elements of the global youth culture
Another localization strategy is visible
in one show that addresses youth culture
directly, Rotana Café. Following a wave of
youth-oriented magazine shows that started
in 2001 , RotallG Café showcases the latest
Rotana music videos and reviews international movies , gossip and fashion σεnds
Presented by Lebanese , Egyptian , Saudi and
Kuwaiti teεnagers ， this daiIy one-hour show
Îs set in a relatively large studio resembling a
café. Tt is characterized by a relaxed attitude
where presenters casually interact with a
handhεld camera while answering inquiries
from callers about the most recent celebrity
•

rumors. The framing of the program as a
coffeehouse with free-wheeling and informal
dialogue echoes the traditional role of the
coffeehouse as a micro-public sphere in Arab
and Ottoman culture. 6 However, unlike the
male only coffeεhouses that still exist in Arab
cities , the program features both genders as
presenters and guests , i1lustrating a subtle
process of localization , which εntails gratìing
local themes and traditions onto the global
music television genre , a process resulting
in the partial transformation of these local
thernes and traditions
Rotana ’ s business strategy i1l ustrat얹 how
Arab corporations profit from hypermedia
space. Rotana ’ s commercial viab i1ity rests
to a large extent on what industry insiders
call value-added services (VAS). These are
available in the form of web dow 띠 oads ，
short message services (SMS) displayed on
a lower third ticker, multÎ-media services
(MMS) , ring tone and web downloads. In
additìon to being profitable , these services
stimulatε dernand for prograrnming and
increase the prospects of synergy with other
services. The Rotana Clip channe1 is a
VAS fiagship , since it f，εatures a number
of interacti ve activities: chatting , J\.α1S and
SMS. Rotana Khaleejiyyah rεceived as rnany
as 50 ,000 SMS messages during its first 3 days
on the air. 7 Through promotional c1ips , Rotana
contributes to cultivating text mcssaging as a
way of life for young Arabs who use Rotana ’s
on-screen ticker to send messages to each
other, inc1 uding love messages or simply to
inform friends that the sender will be late to
an appOJntment
Rotana ’ s mantra of maintaining a conserva
tive identity compatible with Saudi traditions
but also introducing Bin Talal' s relatively
1i beral views makes this channel a hyblid
space in which traditions overlap with modern
technologies. The choice ofLebanon , the Arab
world ’ s most culturally liberal country, as its
major site of operation , reficcts this policy
While Rotana ’ s VAS indicate that the channel
is cognizant of and cu 1ti vates hip trends
among Arab youth, Rotana ’ s comrnitment to
Islamic religious practices is a clear indication
of its commitment to tradìtion. Dming theholy
•
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month of Ramadan , present리 s dress more
conservatively and music videos are carefully
selected. TIrroughout the year, programming
is inteπupted for prayer five times a day for
5 minutes as slick gr‘ aphicsovεrlaid with video
footage of pilgrims praying in Mεcca c a11s
viewers to prayer. When the Saudi King Fahd
died in 2005 , Rotana paid tribute to its Saudi
owner hip by broadcasting mourning)lJusìc
for several days. At the S3mε time , Rótana
programs reftect relatively progressivε Vlews
on women ’ s rights , the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and terrorisrn.
Rotana reflεcts a wider trend across the
industry, staying within thε SOClO• political
bounds of the Saudi mainstream whilε mtroducing nεw elements from both the global
media industry and global youth culture to
lming audiences. In the following section
we analyze several youth media ‘ sites ’ to
explain how commercial and socio-po1itical
concerns overlap and shapε Arab youth media
to various degrees. Located on a continuum of
most to least commεrcialized ， we analyze one
Lebanese television program, Mini Studio ,
followed by a discussion of MBC 3 and
Space Toons , a satellite channel dedicated to
youth entertainment, and AI-Jazeera Children
Channel , a rεcent venture launched under the
mantra of ‘ edutainment’

‘

’

ARAB YOUTH BETWEEII!
CO II! SUMERISM A II! D EDUCAT O ll!
Arab mεdia have bεcome increasingly commercial in thε past decade. Lebanese media
were the ear1 y Arab pioneεrs in producing
commercially viable television programs. The
mushrooming of private television stations
in the 1990s in the absεnce of an adequate
regulatory framework revived Lebanon as
the most dynamic Arab media market for
somε time , a role Lebanese television held
in the 1970s when it exported drama series
to the emerging Gulf government television
channels. 8 It is in this context that ιlini
Studio , following a French tradition of
children programs , was launched by MU lT
Television in 1992, first in Lebanon only, and
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later in the Arab world when MTV began
satellite broadcasting in the late 1990s. The
program moved to LBC in 2002. Tbis daily
half-hour show follows a magazine format
featuring a regular group of performers and
guεst characters, with various parts, such as
storytεlling， songs, cartoons ànd games ‘
The show went through several stages
First , it focused on a simple magazine format
with various segments , such as storytelling ,
gadgets and birthdays. It featured children as
a studio audience. It emphasized a European
‘ feel ’, both in terrns of thε way the characters
were dressed and the song lydcs in French and
English. In the second stage , it maintained thε
previous elements with a focus on youngel
perfonners , as wel1 as including children
as actual talent. A main change was the
inclusion of product placement as well as
sεgment sponsors. The perforrners/hosts plug
products either by using or distributing them
to the studio audience. In addition, the show
expanded into ancillary productions: plays ,
video cassettes and CD song compi1 ations
As a result of this commerci a1 success , the
television and advertising industdes dubbed
the show as ‘Mi ni Market’ ‘ Aftεr being
launched on a pan-Arab scale first through
h TV in 2000 and currently through LBC ,
Mini Studio adapted to this new demographic
by including English as a second language
for songs and dialogue. Producers of the
show selected , supported and promoted an
all-singing-and-dancing childrεn band under
the name Kids' Power. 9
Mini Studio was a pioneering Arab tele
vision program for children. Culturally, it
blurred the language barriers , as its performers
crossed between Arabic , English and French ,
reflecting the Arabs ’ colonial past and the
currεnt multilinguallandscape where English
has bεcome a global language , permeating
youth mεdia culture. Economical1y, this show
revolutionized the ways the advertising indus
try targeted children; it introduced systematìc
product placernent , with members of the
audiencε shown on camera using products
placed in the show and advertised during
commercial brealcs. This helped spread the
notion that children ’ s television in the Arab

‘
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world can be a profìtable business , a lesson
that was not lost on the Middle East
Broadcasting Center as it was εxpan며 ng
operations by essentially becoming a network
A key element in that expansion is MBC 3, a
channel exc1 usively dedicated to children and
young people
Almost 15 years after its launch , thε
Middle East Broadcasting Center rnoved to
create a multicasting platform for the Arab
family. Moving from a traditional , onechannel , general audience approach, MBC
now has two channels targeting young peoplε
MBC 2 offers Western movies that attract
both youth and their parents , and has been
particularly succεssful in Saudi Arabia , where
movie theaters are banned. MBC 3, launched
from Dubai in 2005 to preempt the launch
of the AI-Jazeera Children Chamlel , focuses
exc1 usively on childrεn and youth. During
the aftεmoon， MBC 3 features young VJs
who introduce the shows , comrnent on them
and Ínteract with the audience via telephone
Program offerings are primarìly frorn the USA
and the UK, broadcast in English, but also
inc1 ude Arabic-dubbed shows 1icensed from
Space Toons , another Arab channel
Taking advantage of the facilities provided
by Dubai Media City, Space Toons w‘lS
launched with a large Iibrary of children ’ s
programs in Arabic. Its Sylian owner, Fayez
Sabbagh , has a long history of dubbing
and distlibuting various Asian and Europcan
cartoons in Arabic. Space Toons broadcasts
cartoons back to back in Arabic with commercial breaks in-between, eschewing program
presenters conllilOll on Arab television. Space
Toons soon grew into a media l1Ub for
chi1dren ’ s programming. In addition to sup
plying MBC 3 with prograrns , Space Toons is
carried by the Orbit pay-κlevision ‘bouquεt’，
which blings in additional incomc as wel1 as
accεss to pay-for-television audicnces. It also
branched into Space Toons English , broad
casting Oliginal versions of its dubbed Arabic
programs. Fina11y, and most interestingly,
Space Toons ventured into producing its own
Arabic cartoons in the fOffilS of vignettes
dεaling with religious themes , such as ‘ Rihlat
EIH엠’， about the Muslirn pilgrirnage , and
•

issuεs.

This is another example of
local themes are grafted
onto global formats to create culturally hybrid
programs.
A venture of this scope is viable because
it is integrated in a media conglomerate with
three types of ancillary business: a magazine
targeting parents and ch i1 dren , cornmercial
representation and advertising of toys , and
a website which ties in a11 these activities
by offering online games and downloads
Followìng the logic of integration , the mag
azine carries telεvision program schedules ,
the toys are flεaturcd in the programs , and
thε wε:bsitc functions as a gateway to the
Space Toons brand. While this company is
a case Shldy of the commercialization of
children and youth rnedia culture in the Arab
world , some of its rivals propound a radically
diffεrent vision of the role of thε media in the
socialization of childr，εn and young people
Reftecting a long-tcrm media Iiva1r y
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Saudi
ownεd MBC 3 was rushεd into being to
‘ scoop ’ the ìmrninent launch of the Qatari
owned Al -Jazeera Children Channe1. While
the two channels compete plimarily for the
Gulf Cooperation Council countrìes ’ audi
ence , they reftect two different ph i1osophies
of youth media , with the former being a
commercial station and the latter pro c1 aiming
a public serv ice mission. For that reason ,
the AI-Jazeera Children Channel , launched
on September 9 , 2005 , jointly by Al -Jazeera
and the Qatar Foundation for Education ,
Science anJ Community Development , is
worlhy of a detailed exarnination. The Qatar
Foundation , public1 y financed by the Qatari
state and headed by Sheikha Moza Bint
Nasser Al -Missned , wife of Qatru ’ s ruler,
owns 90% of the venhlre , which broadcasts
from Education City in Qatar‘ 10 The channεl
came on the heels of the flagship Al -Jazeera ,
AI-Jazeera Sp OltS , AI-Jazeera live (public
affairs) and the impending launch of the
English-language Al-Jazεera English. II
Most distinctive about the new channel is
the fact that it is ‘ a private company but
with a pub1ic service mission and is publicly
funded ’ , in the words of Jean Rou i11 y, CEO of
Ramadan

‘ localization ’， whεre
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Lagardere Intemational Images , a subdivisîon
of the Prench conglomerate Lagardere , which
was instrumental in setting IIp the chan
nel technically. lO Thus , Al -Jazeera Childfiεn
Channel is not a commercial channel , but ,
as Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer aI-Thani ,
chair of the board of AI-Jazeera , explains ,
a ‘ bright alternative to thε CUlTcnt trends in
telcvision broadcasting where children are
exposed to violent and inappropriate material
on a daily basis' (Ohrstrom , 2005). However,
the new channel eschewεd the didactic
style of Arab educational or devεlopment
tclevision programs , aiming to provide what
executives called ‘ educatîonal fun ’ 10 whi1 e
inculcating valuεs such as tolerance , openmindedness and freedom of expression. In
press statements , the new channel espouses
the concept of ‘ edutainrnent’, through which it
‘ opens up avenues for the Arab children to
leam about different ... cultures ... landJ help
them develop posìtive self-esteem , respεct
their traditions and values , and appreciate
people around thlεm and develop a passion for
learnin
earnln !l’
!l 12
The declared commitment to local produc
tion expressed in statements by AI-Jazεera
Children Channe1 executives makes the chan
nel 이에따tive， at least until actual program
ming grids prove otherwise. The channel ’s
programrning grid comprises around 40% of
original programrning , amounting to 6 or 7
hours a day out of the 18 to 19 hours of
transmission (Ohrstrom, 2005). According
to ch31mel director I\ ahnoud Bouneb , the
channel wi11 broadcast 18 hours per day, out
of which 6 hours are live , 3 hours are com
missioned abroad and 4 hours are produced
in thε channel ’ s studios. 13 The locally madε
programs did not shy away from controversy
Within 1 month after launch , Se h/w wa
SalamQ (Health and Sqfety) broached the
issue of female genital circumcision , and
other programs featureù children opining on
relatively sensitive social and political issues
(Ohrstrom , 2005). This is within AJ Jazeera ’ s
overall spirit to broach taboo issues
An article published on the Aljazeera.nεt
website provides a rationale for the
Titlεd
‘ AI-Jazeera
Children
channe1.
•

’
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Channel ... A reading of the notion and
a c rÎ tique of the vision ’ , the 3l1icle argues that
the new channel fills an important gap in Arab
media because ‘ there were ambitioLl s projects
aiming to care for children , but they did not
show children a real interest and dedicated
themselves to tal싸 ng about hobbies and
mOVles ’ and carries a stinging indictment
of Arab media as ‘mεdia that jump at thε
peels in the absence of an 앉 sence ... arε
in a11 their fonns sterile ’ (Bouqanoun , 2005)
In contrast , AI-Jazeera ChiJdren Channel
would advocate that Arab children should
have a voice and be productive membεrs
of their societies ‘ We must address Arab
C벼 dren in an interactive manner ’, the
writer says , ‘ so as to transfonn them into
instruments of knowledge and givε them
a productive capacity so that they express
their opinions on issues that Înterest them
and contribute to the foundation of a better
future' (Bouqanoun , 2005). The new channel
would thus contribute to εducational refonn
throughout the Arab world by empowering
children and young people and focusing on
sclf-criticism and engagement in intercultural
dialognes. The author also under1 ines thε fact
that the channel was crεated out of ‘ a strong
politic며 wi11’, widely assumed to be that of
Qatm ’ s influential first lady, and that becausε
of this support it was going to be viable
For all thesεprollllsεs ， theAI-Jazeera Chil
dren Channel st i11 faced numerous problems
First , setting it up was a long affair that
exceeded its budget. Plans callεd for a fully
digitized , completely ‘ tape-lcss ’ operat lOn
from production to transmissÎon. However,
softwarε and budgeting problems , along
with varying visions of sεveral key actors ,
undermined this aim. 14 Second , [rom thε
vely first days of broadcasting , the new
channε1 attractεd criticism for delivering le~써
than what it launchers promised. Because
of the AI-Jazeera legacy, the chamlel faced
skepticism even before its launch. In a column
titled ‘ The children of AJ-Jazeera ’ , lbrahim
며 Ariss (2이)5) ， editor for television and
cinema at the pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat , hoped
that the channel will not promote extremism,
and that ‘ language lessons not be to learn

‘
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how to wlite ta핸ri statements ... and that
program guests llot be from outside of thlε
era ’ 15 Six weeks later, acolumnist in thε same
newspaper poignantly criticized the station fm
‘ putting amateurs in charge' and for having
young adult talk-show hosts who knew less
than their children guests about thε tOplCS
under discussion (Arnin , 2005). While these
critiques are at least partiaIIy valid , more time
18 neεded before a systematic appraisal of
the channel ’ s perronnance can be conducted ‘
It is also important to note that the channel ’ s
avowed pub 1ic service mission makes it a
unique children-01iented media institution in
the Arab world , 16
The sudden interest ofleading transnational
Arab broadcasters to youth channels needs
careful assεssment. Arguably, the need for
specific demographics to attract advertisers
is important, but it cannot sole]y explain the
surgε of interes t. MBC 3 can bε understood
as an attempt to prepare loyal adult audîences
for its llagship channel as the MBC network
reinvents itself as the one-stop channel for the
Arab family. In addition , MBC 3 is free to
air , with no costs incurred by thε Vlewers ‘
Furlhermore , MBC 3 has been seliously
attempting to present itself as a Gulf-based
channeJ. U nlike Al-Jazeera Children Channel ,
its road shows have focused on the Arabìan
Gul f. While the use of English programs is
attributed 10 a scarcily of Arab children ’ S
productions , it a180 reflects a mu1tilingu a1
audience. Thε choice of ‘ Space Toons ’ as a
name for another ch i1 dren’ s channel reflects
the growing pervasiveness and acceptance
of English by Arab audiences , itself a
symptom of media globalization. But if these
channels' prograrns are revealing about the
sociaI and commercìal dimensions of Arab
youth , other mεdia take on a more political
dimension , whether directly as in the case
ofthε US-funded ‘ public diplomacy ’ stations
Radio Sawa and AI-Hurra television , or in
the casε of rea1ity television shows that
were politicized by viewers and appropriated
in street demonstrations , most notably in
Beirut. The following section of this chaptel'
examines how Arab youth popular culture
intersects with Ar ab politicallife

POLITICS. lI'OU I\I G PEOPLE A I\II> THE
ME I>I A 11\1 THE ARAB WORW
Because of the current geo-political juncture ,
rnyriad issues related to Arab rnass rnedia
have been politicized between theArab world
and the West , especially the USA , but even
more significantly, within the Arab world
itself. Since the invasions of Afghanistan and
Ir aq by the USA and some allied forces , the
Arab satel1 ite news channels have been the
sources of anxiety among Westem , rnainly
American , politicians and mi1itary leaders
Most of this anxiety and anger have focused
onAl-Jazeera , with some accusing the channel
of cooperating with AI-Qaeda and the Iraqi
insurgency. While a dεtai1 ed discussion of
these important issues falls beyond the scope
of this chapter, American perceptions that
Arab meclia al'e hostile to lhe USA has
triggered major initiatives under the public diplornacy umbrella , including AI-Hun'a
television , Radio Sawa, and Hi Magazine
Urùike AI-Huna , a news and public affairs
television channel for Arabs of a11 ages , Radio
Sawa was consciously conceived as a blend
of news and entertainrnent targeted at Arab
youth , hencε its relevance to this chapter
Radio Sawa is the brainchild of the
Broadcasting Boal'd of Govemors , the body
responsible for American intemational broadcasts referred to as ‘ public diplomacy ’ bytheir
proponεnts and ‘ propaganda’ by critics , This
station offlεrs a format that appeals to youth by
focusing mostly on music , a sharp departurε
from Voice of Am erica’ s Arabic service ’s
blend of news , CUITent affairs , documentaries
and musÎc. The station was officially launched
in March 2002 , and by late summer 2002 it
was reaching more Arab listeners than had
the Voicc of America (Boyd , 2002) , In deed ,
Sawa is the only (relative) success story in
the US public diplomacy initiative towards the
Arab world , considering that Hi Magazine was
shutdown in Decembel' 2005 and the status
of A1 -Hun'a television is in question as of
this writing , with the channel facing high
level slaff departures in thε wake of several
surveys showing it with 1않s than 1% of the
Arab television news audience. Radio Sawa ’s
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success is partly due to the recognition by its
overseers of the power of popular cu1ture to
reach young Arabs
Sa、Na ’ s great ìnnovation was a station for
mat that mixed Arabic and English-language
pop music with short newscasts every hour.
How trus radio station was received is perhaps
best deSClibed in the numerous stories of taxi
drivers in Arab capitals listening to Sawa
music and switching to another channel when
the newscast began only to move the dial
back when the new hour of rnusic came
in. Arabs liked thε music and 1istened to it ,
but the newscasts were not credible because
listeners knew it was a US govermnent
sεrvice. However, the innovative fonnat was
SQon emulated by other stations , including
Marina FM in Kuwait, thε first private FM
station in that country and one that is rapidly
gaining 1isteners. Although il111ovative , this
f Olmat is not unprecedented in the rεg lOn ， as
some of the music video sate1li te television
channels mixed Arabic and Westem pop
several years before the advent ofRadio Sawa
If Radio Sawa showed Washington policy
rnakers that young Arabs can be reached
by mixing politics with popular culture,
the emerging hypermedia space gave young
Arabs new opportunities for self-expression
and participation in public life. The wave of
reality television and music video prograrns
and channels is evidence of the rampant
commercialization of Arab hypennedia space
But these programs also provide Arab youth
with thε tools to parlicipate in public debates
Nowhere is this more evident than in the way
the rituals of reality television were ‘recruited ’
in what We얀 elTI observers c a11ed thε ‘ Cedar
Revolution ’ in Lebanon. 17
The series of street demonstrations that
occurred in Beirut in the wake of the
assassination of Lebanon’ s previous Prime
Minister Rafiq al-H따iri were perhaps the
first major Arab political event in which
the emerging hypermedia space played a
visible role. Demonstrators used mobile
phones and text-messaging to mobilize and
organize supporters , exchange crucial tactical
infonnation , anJ take picture ‘ that could
be easily transmitted out of the area of
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the demonstrations. Young people played
a pivotal part in the demonstrations , with
university student organizations as the 1εading
organizational force. There was clear media
savvy among the young demonstrators , who
used color-coordínated clothing and painted
Lε:banese flags on their faces likε football
fans worldwide. Morε ìmportan t1 y, several
media friendly ‘ spectacles ’ were organized ,
including a gigantic human Lebanese fiag
made by 10,000 Pεople holding green , red
and white cardboard squares , the Lebanese
colors. Most interesting were the signs that
demonstrators carrieJ, which included words,
phrases and slogans from re머ity television ,
such as ‘ Addoum , Nominee’ , which called
for the sacking of Lebanon ’ s pro-Syrian
prosecutor general
On March 14 , 2005 , when approximately
1 million demonstrators filled Beirut’ s centra1
Martyrs Square to protest at Hariri ’ s assassl
nation and to demand the withdrawal ofSyrian
troops from Lebanon , many signs featured
pictures of dεspised p 이 iticians and security
officers with ‘ nominations ’ to be voted out
ofthe ‘ show ’, a c1ear appropriation of reality
television for political activism. One sign
in partícular illustrated this appropriation. 1t
featured a photograph of Lebanese president
Emile Lahoud. a major ally of Syria whose
mandate was unconstitutionally extended by
Syrian fiat. with the word ‘ nornmee ’ above
the picture and the words ‘ Vote 1559 ’
underneath it. St r Academy , the Arabic
language adaptation of a format owned by
the Dutch format house Endemol and known
in the UK as Fame AcadenlY , has been the
Arab world ’ s most popular and controversi a1
reality television show. Every week , audience
members call dedicated four-digit mobile
phone numbers to vote for one of two
nominees they wish to save from expulsion
from the show. In the demonstrator ’ S slgn ,
‘ 1559’ is an ironic appropriation in that it
refers to United Nations Security Council
Rel olution 1559, which called among other
things for the withdraw a1 of Syrian troops
from Lebanol1
This overlap of politics and popular culture
is indicative of a larger trend in the Arab

“
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world where political activists increasingly
appropriate elements of youth media culture
This can be seen on sevεrallevels. First of all ,
the use of mobile phonεs and text-messaging
to mobilize support for a re a1ity television
contestant and to forge alliances with likeminded viewers has been transfeπed to
the organization of political demonstrations
Second , the hip sartorial style of reality
telεvision and music videos is ernployed by
demonstrators to attract the attention oftelevisìon cameras , something that young Lebanese
excelled at in the Beirut demonstrations
Third, as the sign we analyzed indicates,
the vocabulary of [1εality television is widely
understood in the Arab world , and is thus an
effective tool to express a political agenda
Finally, activists who protested against the
auth01itarianism of the Mubarak regime in
Egypt , against Syrian control of Lebanon ,
or suppol1ed women ’ s political rights in
Kuwait have become adept at adopting Sh011 ,
memorable and media-friendly slogans like
thε ones that penneate youth popular culture

CONClUSION
The relationship that Arab youth have with
media and inforrnation technologies is highly
complex. In addition to thε economic , social
and cultural challenges faced by youth in
developing countries , Arab youth and children
have to contend with the radical polîticization
of their relationship with media and culture
Whεreas children and youlh wor1 dwide are at
the centεr of debates about edllcation , con
sumerism and socia1ization , in the Arab wor1 d
the youth and childhood are a180 a political site
of struggle where hot-button isslles such as
teIT01ism , A.Tab-Westem relations , and Arab
govεmance play OU t. The corporations and
govemments that cornpete to win over this
demographic are not only Arab , but in c1 ude
transnational corporations and the American
gove111ment
Thi s media environment (what we refeITed
to as hypennεdia space) provided this chapte
with several revealing case studies. First , the
AI-Jazeera Children Channel Ìs a promîsing
•

,

venture because it has a self-declared public
service mission and at the same time it enjoys
a secllre financial basis. As an initiative of
Qatar’ s Sheikha Moza, probably the Ar ab
wo r1 d’ s most powerful and infiuεntial first
lady , and ample funds from Qatar ’ s vast natu
ral gas reserves at a time when gas is at a record
high price , the Al-Jazeera Children Channel
transcends two difficulties that have often preempted successful children’ s programs in the
Arab world and elsewhere: political backing
and financial resources. These two i8sues are
most important because they determine how
much support goes to local production. Also ,
finaljudgment will havε to await the channel ’s
actual perfonnancε and the degree to which
it fulfills plans that for the most part are
still on paper. There are two other challenges
that the channel will have to overcomε
attracting an audiencε and having competent
managemen t. Success in those areas may
stimulate competitors and increase the quality
and quantity of children prograll11lling
Sεcond ， it is c1 ear that , in spite of the
cornmercialization of sociallife , the new Arab
commercial media environment enhances
young people’ s ability for self-expression and
participation in pub1ic 1ife. The appropriation
of reality tεlevision rituals and vocabulary
during the 2005 Beirut demonstrations is
perhaps the most notable εxample of how
youth media clllture contributes to 80cial
and p이itical εmpowerment， but examples
elsewhere (Egypt and Kuwait) suggest that
this trend can be found throughout th，ε Arab
world. The ultimate challenge for Arab youth
is t.ranslating the pluralism of publ ic life into
inclusive goven디 ance ， taking into account the
needs of children and young people in policy
formulation and implernentation
Third , rεIi gion is imp 0l1ant in the study
of Arab youth and media as , on the one
hand a social , cultural and political force ,
and, on the other hand, as a field of analysis
Having said this , we should eschew making
Islarn an independent vmiable sitting at
the center of political, socio-cultural and
communìcation processes in the Arab wor1 d
Rather, as the dεvelopment of Islamic mεdia
and lslamic popular culture indicate , Tslarn
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is a differentiated , complex , and unstablε
categ Olγ Jncreasingly, the Arab media are
bεcorning an arena of competition betwecn
various fonns of Islam , as in the example
mentioned before of Kh aled challenging
al-Qaradawi ’ s interpretations , or of the varia
tions that are set to emerge between relatively
traditionalistIslarnic channel , such as al-Majd
and lqraa on the one hand , and , on thε
other hand , those explicitly ‘ modcmizing ’
Islamic channels , such as al-Risala. Many
analysts of Arab societies , us included , believe
that mainstream Islamic media provide an
important space for the emergence of modern ,
i. e. self-reflexive , adaptive , and forward
thlnking Islamic values and identities
In this chapter we havε attempted to provide
a broad survey of the complex relationship
betwecn young people and the rnedia in the
Arab world. Socio-economic c1 ass , geograph
icallocation , religion and 1i nguistic abi1 ity are
some of the most important differences that
shape how young Ar abs relate to the media
We adopted a top-down , deductive and mostly
theoretical approach in order to accornmodate
the large variety of issuεs to be discussed in
order to understand Arab youth and media
issues. This was partly due to the paucity of
actual audience studies in the A1‘ ab world ,
hindered by a variety of factors , including
the lack of systematic indigenous research
activity and social and religious restrictions
on field research ‘ Wh ile the advantage of this
approach is to account for the breadth of the
topic , we point the readers to a variety of
readings on Arab rnedia that provide more
location- and culture-specific sources. 18
•

NOTES
1 We use 'Arab youth' broadly to include children
We use 'children ’ only when 뼈 re are issues where
chi 떠 ren ， and not older young people , are the
ex 미 cìt focus of discus잉 on ， such as our discussion of
미 Jazeera Children Channel
2 The United Nations Population Fund
Overview: The Arab 5tates. http://www.unfpa.org/
profile/arab_overview.htm [August 2007J
3 For a detailed ana 야 is and critique of this
phenomenon , see Kraidy (2005)
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4 Here we are usinq Mead ’ 5typology of postfigura
tive , cofigurative , and pre띠 urative cultαes ， which in
descending order give more importance to hierarchy
and vertκallearning. See Mead (1 970)
5 See Richard Agnew (2005) and 에 z Khan (2005)
6 For a history of some urban coffeehouses in the
Middle East , see Kirli (2004)
7 Second author intervi 민N with Fouad Tarabay,
10 니 nding Managing Oirector of Rotana Khale리 iah ，
August 2005
8 For a discussion of a crucìal period in the
development of Lebanc γ5 television market , see
Kr히 dy (1998)
9 The second author of this chapter was an MTV
executive at the time. The show was renamed 'The
Kids Power Show' for intellectuaJ property purposes
1。 이 Jazeera launche잉 d미 dren's channel to teach
t이 erance (2005 , September 10). Daily Star [Agence
France Pre잉 se]
11 In fac t, 미 Jazeera offic떠lI y declared itself
a 'network' , as opposed to a ’ channel' , in early
September 2005. See 'Before launching its c비 dren ’ s
chann 빈 next Friday: 이 Jazeera becomes a network
for privatization 7' (2005 , September 6). Assafir
12 셰 Jazeera launches kids chann티 (2005 ,
September 11). Company Press Release
13 'Before laun 띠 ng its ch 뼈 ren's channel next
Friday: AI-Jazeera becomes a network
for privatization7' (2005 , September 6). Assafir
14 Personal interviews conducted by first author
with members of the launching team , November
2005 , Paris , France
15 The word takfiri refers to the practice by some
radicallslamists to declare Muslims who do not agree
with t때 r 씨 ews non-Mu찌 ims ， and thus indirectly
promote violence against these ’ fake' Muslims
16 There could be an 'edutainment' trend develop
ing in youth media , with Yemen recently announcing a
new television service for young people in asso 디 atlon
with the national university there
17 See Kraidy (2006b); for a discussion of how
realηy television entered the fray of politics in Kuwait
and Lebanon , see Kraidy (2007)
18 For gener비 references on Arab media , see
Boyd (1999) and 5akr (2001). The volume by
Eickelman and Anderson (1999) has a broader,
Muslim world scope. For analysis of the Arab internet,
see Gonzalez-Quijano (2003/2004). For 셰 -Jazeera ，
see EI-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002) Lamloum (2004)
For television and national identity in Egypt , see
Abu-Lughod (2005) and Armbrust (1996). For a
feminis t, Islam-focused analysis , see μ ernissi (1992)
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